

## Institutional fragility – challenge for peacebuilding in Kosovo

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### **Abstract**

*Peace building, as part of conflict resolution strategy, is challenged by several internal factors with socio-economic, political, governmental nature, and factors coming from outside the country and violent past under governance of ex Yugoslavia/Serbia. This process becomes more difficult by the transition from socialist to free economy.*

*Kosovo independence undermines taking responsibilities by institutions on peace building perspective which will bring to the gradual reconciliation with neighbors, including Serbia. Growing authoritarian tendencies on decision making mechanisms chock already existing fragile democracy. Enhancing the rule of law and system of justice will create a good basement for elimination of corruption and increase the quality of governance as strengthening elements of the social peace and reconciliation between the communities inside Kosovo.*

*Even that, Kosovo institutions have made huge efforts in building the state mechanisms in preparation for the country's independence phase. Rise of care in the rule of law, legislation implementation, efforts for combating corruption as a major source of state vulnerability, democratic institution building, and economic development, will be the challenges faced Kosovo's future.*

*Key words: Peace building, institutional fragility, corruption, illegal Serbian structures.*

### **Introduction**

This article identifies current challenges to peace and stability in Kosovo after the war. Growing tendencies to establish institution of corruption within Kosovo institutions is worst sign for peace builders in Kosovo, engaged on building democratic state mechanisms as preconditions for inhibiting return at conflict circle. Also, here are highlighted difficulties as a result of regional and foreign factors challenging the peace building processes within Kosovo environment. Sooner evolvement of Kosovo institutions within EU cupolas will help this part of Balkans switch from organized infrastructure.

### **Achievements and the Kosovo peace building challenges**

Successes and achievements by international community in Kosovo when building multiethnic institutional at different government levels are made through good collaboration with the locals.

However, “Although legally in charge of the entire territory, UNMIK has proven incapable of ending Belgrade’s *de facto* control of three and a half northern municipalities in Kosovo... as well as several Serb enclaves in central and eastern Kosovo. This inability to control all of Kosovo’s territory has led to the creation of a dual system in almost every aspect of political and economic life in Kosovo”.<sup>1</sup> The civilian, and to some degree the military, international administration incapability to control overall Kosovo territory, created unfavorable circumstances for the future status of Kosovo. UNMIK did not managed to implement its own policies on integration the north and citizens from this part of Kosovo, leaving space for future state vulnerability as a potential for conflict. This administration hold on basic competencies for nine years, prevented Kosovo institutions to exercise responsibilities, contrary with reactions by several organizations<sup>2</sup>. As result, this heritage from UNMIK administration is going to disrupt peace building processes at the post independence period of Kosovo, failing to fulfill the Montevideo criteria<sup>3</sup>, to enter at interstate relations, respectively, to achieve international recognitions. Additionally, stuck between implementation the policy derived from international law, and pressures by locals pushing for independence, UNMIK didn’t impose the mandate to build neither to obstruct Kosovo state building.

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<sup>1</sup> Daniel Serwer and Yll Bajraktari, United States Institute of Peace Special Report 172 August 2006, Kosovo Ethnic Nationalism at Its Territorial Worst, [www.usip.org](http://www.usip.org)

<sup>2</sup> Kosovo Roadmap (II) : Internal Benchmarks ICG Balkans Report N° 125, 1 March 2002,p. iii.

<sup>3</sup> Article 1 of Montevideo Convention on Rights and Obligations of States, 1933, States must have: a) Permanent population, b) determined territory , c) government and d) capacity to enter in relations with other states.

Call and Cook<sup>4</sup> analyses made for 18 states experienced with UN peacekeeping missions between 1988 to 2002, all with political competencies for institution building, and 13 of them were qualified with nuances of authoritarian regimes. Most of these states have made improvements compared to their predecessors, but they failed to fulfill the expectations of international observers and local population. In Kosovo, after 2-3 year pro international and local mechanisms euphoria, and in the absence of achievements in terms of status settlement and expected socio-economic improvements, started euphoria took the opposite direction. After independence, originated the government's authoritarian tendencies by the government<sup>5</sup>, citizen dissatisfactions on expectations, inability to attract foreign direct investments, tendencies to sold everything to cover disability of finding alternative ways on economic recovery, lack of law implementation, and inability to establish the peaceful and civilized culture on resolving the political contests at the parliament but of leaving sessions by the governing parties, made Kosovo institutions as undignified and with the potential for crisis. EULEX inability for action against violators of law in Kosovo against Serbian structures at north of Kosovo, not used when required executive mandate, weakens excepted confidence by majority population in Kosovo in a different approach than that of UNMIK, that mean decisiveness on improving the security structures, judiciary, and combats corruption as elements of stabile institution building. Kosovo institutions didn't succeed to convince people from the north of Kosovo to be involved with country institutions through soft power and without violence, and thus opened the space to international mechanisms to get involved with offering the solutions which will encourage further with compromises for the north part of Kosovo. Neither international community "since 1999, when took the control did nothing to integrate that part under Kosovo governance. That situation, Serbs will use as strong argument for border change claim. Sure, such thing will open other discussions, i.e. idea that Preshevo Valley to be united with Kosovo, but I'm not going to say that will happen ".<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Charles T. Call and Susan E. Cook, "On Democracy and Peacebuilding," *Governance After War: Rethinking Democratization and Peacebuilding*. Special issue (Vol. 9:2, Spring 2003) of *Global Governance* (co-edited by Charles Call and Susan Cook). [www.reinner.com](http://www.reinner.com)

<sup>5</sup> Decisions on ciment tariffs exported from Albania and removal after presions, boycott parliamentary séances by the government parties on July and October 2012, tendencies for orchestral with parliament by the government...are some of fragile actions by the government.

<sup>6</sup> Morton Abramovicz, *Kosova të jetë e përgatitur për negociata të mundshme politike me Serbinë*, interview at VOA with Keida Kostreci, July 1, 2010, at: <http://lajme.shqiperia.com/lajme/artikull/iden/1046922294/titulli/Abramovic-Kosova-te-jete-e-pergatitur-per-negociata-te-mundshme-politike-me-Serbine>, (Accessed 2 October , 2011).

Despite membership in IMF and WB, Kosovo experienced throwback on meeting the conditions for Stand-By Arrangements with IMF, which resulted with twice in cutting the macro finance assistance, before returning back to the previous stage. A handicap to peacebuilding stakeholder efforts is lack of results on openness toward the world, which will cost to the country in tackling the poverty, in the businesses, education, culture sectors...despite convincing promises that barriers on freedom of movement will be breakthrough after fifteen months.<sup>7</sup>

Kosovo is not showing political will, except declarations in preventing the occurrence of the gray economy, corruption, organized crime<sup>8</sup> and intimidation against judges<sup>9</sup>, etc.

Often, Kosovo institutions are presented not mindful in the international councils and mentoring which resulted with negative consequences for them. Avoidance of WB and IMF recommendations according the budget management, or negligence case by Ministry of Internal Affairs about the lack of planning and guidance of border patrols, leaving it to patrol officers liability, led to the arrest of two border policemen in Kosovo from Serbian gendarmerie. This was suggested in the 2010 EULEX Report given the Kosovo<sup>10</sup>.

Based on what was said, peacebuilding challenges are those with inner nature, and those with regional and international implications, all interfere with each other.

Undertaken activities by international and local community on the field of capacity building, institution building, rule of law, respecting the human rights, demilitarization, and transformation the alienated Kosovo society toward reconciliation, were not easy processes and were followed by their implementation difficulties. These difficulties were mainly due to the mutual exclusion and incompatibility between two main ethnic constituents' in Kosovo, Albanians and the Serbs. Illegal Serbian structures in Kosovo, financed and politically inspired from the Serbian government<sup>11</sup>, present the biggest challenge to the peacebuilding processes. They continue to maintain a climate of intolerance and avoidance from cooperation by the Serbs from north with the institutions of newly created state.

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<sup>7</sup> Promise by PDK leader, H.Thaçi during the 2009 election campaign.

<sup>8</sup> European Commission, Kosovo Progress Report, 2008/2009, point 4.3.4.p.23.

<sup>9</sup> European Commission, Kosovo\* 2011 Progress Report, SEC(2011) 1207 final Brussels, 12.10.2011,p. 12.

<sup>10</sup> EULEX Report 2011, Përkrahja e Sundimit të Ligjit në Kosovë: Vlerësimi i Gjendjes,p. 22.at: <http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/docs/tracking/0959%20EA%20II%20EG%20BI%20-%20EULEX%20Programme%20Report%202011%20-%20ALB.pdf>, (Accesed 12 august, 2012).

<sup>11</sup> Look at [http://www.unosek.org/docref/2006-08-04\\_CG%20Statement\\_on\\_the\\_situation\\_in\\_Northern\\_Kosovo-english.pdf](http://www.unosek.org/docref/2006-08-04_CG%20Statement_on_the_situation_in_Northern_Kosovo-english.pdf), (Accesed 12 august, 2012).

The fragile Kosovo institutions are immersed in the high level of corruption (nepotism, clans), mediocrity, and not at the competitive values, presenting a serious obstacle in the way of Kosovo towards international integration processes.

As the purest part of ex Yugoslavia, Kosovo is still faced with that problem and continuous generating persistent unemployment and poverty rates which are the highest in Europe.

Lack of movement of Kosovar citizens abroad, due to visa restrictions, the entrance at the labor market of about thirty thousand young and decreased indicators of foreign investments and remittances, challenge Kosovo and its institutions with a not easily or quickly addressable socio-economic instability. Just achieving a balance between import and export will neutralize the mentioned obstacles, but it's hard to reach attraction to the investors for a country just get out of a war.

Kosovo's trade deficit elimination would be achieved through well-structured private production, substitution of import, careful use of the comparative advantages of different sectors in the region, etc. But, offered advantages by the enticement elements often neutralized by prohibitive ones. They include a lack of infrastructure, specially the power supply, which is not possible to be normalized for at least half a decade. This area has also been devouring the budget revenue. Quality of the roads and railway network and unfavorable approach to the coastal ports and international roads, made the trade in Kosovo to be costly. Difficulties to start and develop business<sup>12</sup>, despite some improvements, investment protection and performance of contracts make Kosovo ranks at last position within 27 countries of east Europe and central Asia<sup>13</sup>. So, in order to develop the private sector in Kosovo, favorable conditions at the field of business regulations must be created, as well a sustainable macroeconomic environment, infrastructure improvements, in addition to adopting and implementing the law on skills and workforce, and elimination favorism during tendering processes in the public sector. "The amount of single-source tendering rose to 164 million Euros in 2009, from 50 million Euros in previous years. This has led to an unfriendly business environment, further damaged by the practice of individuals and groups close to senior governmental officials establishing *ad hoc* companies that then apply for and win tenders for public contracts. This has only added to suspicions of

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<sup>12</sup>World Bank, Doing Business 2012: Doing Business in a More Transparent World, <http://www.doingbusiness.org/~media/fpdkm/doing%20business/documents/profiles/country/KSV.pdf>, (Accessed 24 October, 2012).

<sup>13</sup> World Bank (2010a), [www.doingbusiness.org](http://www.doingbusiness.org).

enormous government corruption”.<sup>14</sup> Support at the budget and spending policies of incoming international assistance and diaspora is not good exit policy from crisis.

Employers at private business sector are subject to the cruel regime of their exploitation by employers. As dysfunctional, their Syndicates have no courage to deal with problems due to the threat by employers cutting the contracts.

Implementation of the adopted laws stagnate in many aspects and presents concern and mistrust to the citizens related to functioning the rule of law. Even after four years as an independent state, Kosovo is facing symptoms of fragile democracy such are forms of corrupted governance, institutional irresponsibility, omission of sovereignty throughout its territory, lack of transparency, and unsatisfied level of justice system, health, education, security, central government and local personalities who are under the burden of charges of international and local judicial institutions, influenced and continue to influence negatively on the admissibility of the state of Kosovo in the world. According to Hoogenboom, there are four obstacles ahead<sup>15</sup>: (1) barriers between the state and citizens, (2) lack of rule of law, (3) interethnic mistrust and segregation, particularly between Serbs and Albanians, and (4) relations between Kosovo and Serbia. Without significant progress in these four areas, Kosovo will not advance towards EU accession.

Another important barrier element on Kosovo peacebuilding is that “the Kosovo Albanian political elite has almost entirely vanished, revealing a deeply divided political class that tends to engage in Personal rivalries at her than work towards programmatic solutions to Kosovo’s socioeconomic and political challenges”<sup>16</sup>, attempting to install their structures at all possible political and economical decision making, aiming enormous and unprecedented enrichment by political elite.

Almost anyone from the Kosovo political elite doesn’t want to adopt a law on the origin of the property and who would have retroactive power of action. This reflects at the satisfactory low level by the Kosovo citizens on the work of

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<sup>14</sup> Ilir Deda, The View from Kosovo: Challenges to Peace-building and State-building, CONNECTIONS, The Quarterly Journal, Volume IX, Number 3 Summer 2010, at [http://kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/122276/ichaptersection\\_singledocument/8355a753-a644-407c-9e8c-900dc29a0323/en/6\\_View\\_from\\_Kosovo.pdf](http://kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/122276/ichaptersection_singledocument/8355a753-a644-407c-9e8c-900dc29a0323/en/6_View_from_Kosovo.pdf), p 88. (Accessed 20 October, 2011).

<sup>15</sup> Jitske Hoogenboom, The EU as a Peacebuilder in Kosovo, paper prepared for CSDN Member State Meeting entitled Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding in the EU's Eastern Neighbourhood and the Western Balkans, Bucurest, Romania. Jitske Hoogenboom, The EU as a Peacebuilder in Kosovo, IKV Pax Christi Utrecht, August 2011.

<sup>16</sup> Dominik Zaum States of Conflict: A case study on statebuilding in Kosovo, p. 5. October 2009, IPPR Institute, [www.ippr.org](http://www.ippr.org), (Accessed 29 October, 2011).

state institutions, which is at lower level until now with only 21% related to the performance for government and 24% for Prime minister<sup>17</sup>.

Continued insistence by Serbia in reopening the issue of political status, tendencies for partition of Kosovo or advancing the north of Kosovo in form of specific creature for this part, presents as one of the biggest challenge for reconciliation in the region. Until now, Kosovo institutions together with the internationals didn't insisted lot at finding the ways to stretch the authority at this part of Kosovo population. The impression is that this is intended "to preserve Serbia's face" and to have "win - win" option on the Kosovo conflict. Negotiations through Kosovo-Serbian developed topics should give impulse at that direction, but bypasses and obstacles which are made by the Serbian government in terms of not implementation the agreements (conclusions), handicapped the process of peacebuilding. Another picture is presented by the Serbians from south part of Kosovo, taking part at the process of decentralization, accommodated at the Kosovo institutions.

Four years after declaration of the independence, Kosovo was recognized by around 46% of the world countries. Despite the positive opinion by International Court of Justice on the legality of the declaration of independence, few recognitions took place.

Dose of complacency to the country's institutions and reception that international friends will perform recognition unfinished work, was not an appropriate tactic. The main problem lies to the five EU countries and mainly Russia which doesn't recognize the state of Kosovo, disabling it to become a member of international mechanisms and to walk toward economic development and reconciliation, first inside Kosovo and in the region. This situation reflects at the continuation of coexistence between mechanisms, a) supporters of independence, government, b) those with neutrality regarding the status, EULEX, UNMIK, and OSCE, and c) those who reject Kosovo's statehood, Serbian "parallel structures" (because of lack Kosovo's government structures). This is aggravating circumstance for the normalization of socio-economic relations and the prospect of Kosovo. Active Serbian structures in Kosovo, which oppose the reality of independent state of Kosovo, cannot eliminate without clear statement coming from EU and USA." Many fear the EU is not up to the task of resolving the Kosovo issue if only because of its divisions on Kosovo. The EU formula for progress in the area is still to be tested while hopes of accession have actually receded. Only in Kosovo has the U.S.

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<sup>17</sup> UNDP, *Pulsi Publik IV*, 2012.

remained the dominant player, often to EU chagrin, because the people of Kosovo consider the U.S. as their only reliable friend”<sup>18</sup>.

Even at difficult political and economic circumstances after the wars fought, Serbia achieved quick rehabilitation. Changes after removal of Milosevic from power started reflecting in the international politics pro Serbia<sup>19</sup>. It took the failure of consensus in the Security Council and the EU on the issue of Kosovo to prevent the new state to state-building processes. Reforms made at the election process, rule of law, submission the most charismatic man, Milosevic, who had Serbs during the last decades and other defendants to the Court for War Crimes in the former Yugoslavia, combat organized crimes, the Serbian statement on not using the force for Kosovo conflict resolution, candidacy for membership at EU, etc. makes Serbia as good partner to the international community on Kosovo issue at the further developments. It reestablished the 1244 resolution through a “footnote”, which will suite Kosovo at the integration processes. This agreement between Kosovo e Serbia according to Bugajski, “puts into question the legality of Kosovo's independence, footnote is potentially damaging”<sup>20</sup>. The same opinion is one by Pettiffer who consider the acceptance of footnote as “big strategic mistake for Kosovo”<sup>21</sup>. Even that and those coming from Kosovo opposition parties, pro agreement statements were made by government, EU and USA. In such way, UN SC returned away to her role at Kosovo issue, avoiding a policy attempted to avoid by transferring the problem of Kosovo to the EU decision-making, which, however, proved not be unique related to the case. Serbia, in fine print and through small door achieve to settle technical negotiation process to political ones, which may result with harmful compromise going beyond Ahtisaari-s Plan.

International community continuously stimulates a attractive policy toward Serbia, supporting to be part of EU and not become Russia’s alley, for which are engaged radicals and alleys in Serbia. This situate double benefit for Serbia, its ranking alongside the West and, and in the case of Kosovo, implementation of win-win policy. To this effect it came with the support of its allies.

In this situation is very expected, similarly to the reality in after war Kosovo, international community to recognize the reality on the ground for the north of

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<sup>18</sup> Morton Abramowitz and James Hooper, *Settling the Balkans*, 07.08.2010. at: <http://national-interest.org/commentary/settling-balkans-3651>, (Accesed 29 September, 2011).

<sup>19</sup> Louis Michel, exterior minister of Belgium, talking on behalf of EU Presidency says: We didn’t change our mind. We are not in favor of independence. Reuters, 19 November 2001.

<sup>20</sup> Interview at Radio Free Europe, at Telegrafi, <http://www.telegrafi.com/lajme/bugajski-pjesemarrja-pozitive-fusnota-negative-2-20595.html>, (Accesed 29 February, 2012).

<sup>21</sup> James Pettiffer at Telegrafi, 18 march 2012, <http://www.telegrafi.com/lajme/pettifer-kosova-ne-rrezik-2-21031.html>, (Accesed 19 March, 2012).

Kosovo, because Serbia is going to exercise functions in that part of Kosovo.<sup>22</sup> Such Serbian structures in Kosovo are known to the international community, to the locals and public, which are often as relevant to all those communities. Common nomenclature as “parallel structures” is not appropriate one. There are not other structures, to be parallel to them. They are illegal one, and challenges not only civilian international administration, but also structures of KFOR, through physical blockade of the roads and other obstacles. At the front of such structures are Serbian Minister for Kosovo, State Secretary for Kosovo, regional heads, mayors of municipalities<sup>23</sup>... Serbia is going to finance complete its state system in Kosovo. In the northern part the Kosovo government does not exercise its effectiveness and responsibilities, thus, as sovereignty is connected to responsibility therefore “to be considered externally legitimate, Kosovo must achieve these conditions”<sup>24</sup> wrote Zaum. Led by the peaceful paradigms on conflict resolution and in keeping with the conclusions of the 2005 World Summit, Kosovo governments had never tried to take any coercive measure in preventing Serbian structures. Those structures raised voices after Kosovo independence declaration. The government had set deadlines several times for stopping old Kosovo/Serbs registration plates, deadlines were prolonged by UNMIK administration or Kosovo institutions. Even when happened any arrest of municipal or security Serbian officers, they were released with short procedures.<sup>25</sup> With such support for illegal structures, Serbia and supporters, especially Russian Federation prefer for Kosovo to remain frozen conflict. “With such frozen conflict Russia will try to expand its influence, to prevent fictionalization of the new state which is pro west, pro NATO and pro American. This is what exactly is pretending Russia”<sup>26</sup>. Serbia also, acted through allies and Russia to hamper Kosovo integration processes.

<sup>22</sup> Office of Coordinator for Strategy of the North: Report on parallel structures: Rezime përmbledhëse Beogradi- me një këmbë në veri dhe me dorë të hapur në Bruksel, at [http://www.kohaditore.com/repository/docs/Raporti\\_per\\_Veri\\_Maj\\_2011\[2\].pdf](http://www.kohaditore.com/repository/docs/Raporti_per_Veri_Maj_2011[2].pdf) (Accessed July 3, 2012).

<sup>23</sup> Goran Bogdanovic, Oliver Ivanovic, Goran Arsic, Nebojsa Nikolic, Miodrag Lazic, Djokica Stanojevic, Milos Dimitrijevic, Aleksandar Babincev, Slavko Stefanovic, Stevan Bozhovic, Boban Jevtic, Dobrosav Dobric, Srecko Spasic... are some of name leaders of parallel structures at different levels of governance.

<sup>24</sup> Dominik Zaum, *The Sovereignty Paradox: The Norms and Politics of International State Building* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

<sup>25</sup> The case of arrest of illegal mayor of Vitia municipality, Srecko Spasic, together with a group of „officials” were released after two days. See at: <http://srb.time.mk/read/8facac8340/eccfac26e7/index.html>, (Accessed 4 April, 2012).

<sup>26</sup> Janusz Bugajski, panelist at Council on Foreign Relations facilitated by Paul B. Stares Director of the Center for Preventative Action and European Studies Program, and Charlie Kupchan, in the topics: Independence for Kosovo?: Managing the Consequences, 14 December 2007.

This was seen especially at influential role that Russia has to the Islamic countries at the processes of recognition.

Economy as a determinant factor for success of peacebuilding and statebuilding, shows no expected positive signs due to the lack of appropriate development policies and isolation from foreign investments. Given that this sector is developing in parallel tracks, formal/informal economy and with enormous elements of corruption, it's indicator of difficulties of the state of Kosovo. It depends from international support. With circumstances when international community is divided between supportive and unsupportive parts on the issue of recognitions for Kosovo sovereignty, make difficult process of state building.

Kosovo has moved significantly to the fulfillment of services to citizens, but taking in consideration that international community and locals made large investments before and after independence, this leaves a large space to be desired. The ratio between investments and achievements is in disproportion. Isn't only adolescence of Kosovo statehood challenging factor of non-fulfillment of the expectations of the citizens. Global economic crisis is another misfortune at the road of a new emerging state. Symptoms of state fragility are coming from undemocratic, authoritative and ignorance behavior within different institution fields.

Montaro<sup>27</sup>, considers that "Kosovo is not a failed state<sup>28</sup>, Kosovo is not a failed state, but it is critically weak along a number of axes, including its legacy of powerful regional clans, a criminal-political nexus, its extreme ethnic polarization, dynamics of parallel authorities competing for legitimacy and its deep economic stagnation".

Peacebuilding challenges in Kosovo are summarized in Box.

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<sup>27</sup> Lucia Montanaro, The Kosovo statebuilding Conundrum: Addressing Fragility in a Contested State, Working Paper 91, FRIDE, October 2009, p. V.

<sup>28</sup> As failed states Katanga and Biafra, tend to separate from Congo respectively Nigeria, but after three years become again part of them.

## Box: Peacbuilding challenges in Kosovo

|                 | Challenges   |
|-----------------|--|
| <b>Internal</b> | Lack of extension of the administration throughout the Kosovo territory<br>Lack of transfer of powers to the locals for nearly nine years,<br>Insufficient participation of Serbs in Kosovo institutions,<br>Different expectations of Albanians and Serbs on Kosovo's status,<br>Small absorptive capacity of the labor force, unemployment,<br>The fragility of the Kosovo institutions, corruption, nepotism,<br>Unsatisfactory level of rule of law and security,<br>Extreme political concurrence,<br>Ethnic distrust and segregation, particularly between Serbs and Albanians,<br>Infrastructural difficulties for carrying out the business (legal and physical),<br>The lack of civil documentation and cadastral,<br>Barriers between the state and its citizens |
| <b>Regional</b> | Relations between Serbia and Kosovo<br>Serbia's insistence on reopening of political status negotiations,<br>Funding of parallel structures<br>Serbian indoctrination propaganda against achievements by the state of Kosovo<br>Obstacles to the implementation of the reached agreements,   |
| <b>Exterior</b> | Lack of movement of Kosovo citizens abroad,<br>Continuous decline of foreign investment and remittances,<br>Disunity of the EU countries regarding the recognition of Kosovo,<br>Allowing Serbian parallel structures in Kosovo,<br>Slow recognitions of Kosovo state,   |

**Conclusions:**

In order to achieve socio-economic stability and sustainable peace, Kosovo institutions should be more open to citizens, insist at implementation of the legislation, approach to peace-building as a dynamic construct through communication routes with people aimed at eliminating the root causes of the conflict and try to work on elimination the internal, regional and exterior challenges. They should stop authoritarian decision-making practices which have negative effects on the public. Behavior of state authorities towards establishing dialogue with northern Serbs should occupy their policy agenda, without forgetting other communities. International support must be focused on implementation of rule of law, economic facilities, and eliminate the recognitions barriers.

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