Abstract

The policymaking process of the European Union (EU) is particularly convoluted and reflects an institutional structure that is unique among governance entities. The institutional structure of the Union is complex, with a multitude of co-decision making and advisory bodies. The ways in which these institutions interact in the Union’s policymaking process (i.e., the EU’s organizational structure) is governed by a complex set of treaties. We argue that institutional and organizational structures have normative content because they embody specific ideologies of integration. A historical analysis of the evolution of European integration reveals that the peculiarities of the European Union’s institutional and organizational structure are a result of the influence of three distinct ideologies about the desired nature of international organization: functionalism, intergovernmentalism, and federalism. The Union's roots as the European Coal and Steel Community and the ideas of Jean Monnet concerning the shape and path of European integration, moderated by federalist and intergovernmentalist ideas, were fundamental in determining the European Union’s institutional structure and shaping its policymaking process.

Key words: European integration history; European institutions; European Coal and Steel Community; European Union;
1. Introduction

Understanding the role of institutions in the process of public policymaking suffers from a curious dichotomy. On the one hand, the related fields of political science, public policy studies, and public administration acknowledge the role of governmental (as well as non-governmental) organizations at every stage of the policymaking process, from problem identification and agenda formation, to policy implementation and evaluation. Thus, most studies focusing on a specific functional policy area consider the role of organizations in policymaking, and understand that institutional and organizational structures affect the ways in which policies are developed, adopted, and implemented in crucially important ways. The literature on this subject spans many years and is very large, only a small sample can be cited here, including Gains (2003), Feiock and Kim (2001), Mény and Wagenaar (2000), Mény et al. (1996), Denhardt (1989), Brunner and Meltzer (1979). Furthermore, we must point out that, in the context of a policymaking system, it is important to differentiate between organizational and institutional structures and analyze the characteristics of both (Hadjilambrinos, 1998, pp. 186-192).

On the other hand, the history of the development of institutions is virtually ignored as an explanatory element in the study of institutions’ role in policymaking. Thus, the potential is created for serious problems and misconceptions in our understanding of the policymaking process. Paul Pierson’s study Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis (2004) presents a particularly insightful discussion of this problems. This, of course, is not to say that the history of institutions is not a frequent subject of study; historical accounts of institutional and organizational development abound. The problem is that such historical accounts generally do not attempt to connect the historical and policymaking dimensions.

This study traces the history of the evolution of the European Union, from the conditions that led to the proposal for a European Coal and Steel Community (World War II and its aftermath) to the Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty), which essentially set the current institutional and organizational structures of the Union. An important objective of the study is to identify the ideological underpinnings of the various streams of thought about the form a political union of European nation-states should have. This approach presumes that normative factors (the ideas or beliefs of particular actors) are primarily responsible for the particular direction the
process of European integration has followed and that these normative factors are discernible in the institutional and organizational structure of the European Union. Traditional analyses of the European integration process have generally divided into two broad categories.

There is general agreement amongst both the historians and theorists of European integration that the particular conditions prevailing in post-World War II Europe and, in particular, the unique problems faced by France created the circumstances that led to the establishment of the first supranational institutions. However, careful analysis of the prevailing political conditions reveals that the challenges of the period could have been met in ways other than the surrender of sovereignty to supranational institutions and that, furthermore, there was no political consensus supporting the supranational solution (and, in fact, there was considerable opposition to the idea). Studies reaching these abound, and include Parsons (2002), Hitchcock (1998), Bossuat (1995), Deighton (1995), Brunet (1993), di Nolfo (1992), Gillingham (1991), and Criddle (1969). The analysis of French politics vis a vis the construction of European institutions in particular, shows that the beliefs of certain key individuals about the shape the international organization of Western Europe ought to take led to the creation of the ECSC and determined the ultimate structure of the European Union:

“Pro-community” leaders who obtained power on other, disconnected issues used their agenda-setting authority to assemble majorities behind their personal ideas and to strike particular international bargains.” (Parsons, 2002, pp. 55-56)

If normative factors such as critical actors’ beliefs can be shown to be a determinant of the institutional structure of the EU, then they can also be shown to affect (though not necessarily determine) the EU’s policymaking process. Political institutions, as organized entities, discriminate among conflicts: they move certain issues to the forefront of political debate while ignoring others, they show preference for certain types of policy solutions, they establish limits on the type and scope of political action, etc. (Egeberg, 2003; Hix, 1998; March and Olsen, 1989). Thus, the ideological foundations of political institutions affect, at least in part, the conduct of politics in the institutions. Therefore, identifying the ideological underpinnings of institutions and relating them to institutional and organizational structures is an essential step in gaining a thorough understanding of policymaking processes.
2. The prehistory of European Union

The idea of a political unification of Europe is not something that arose from the devastation of World War II. It can be traced much farther than that, to at least the fourteenth century, developing in parallel with the institution of the nation state. In fact, the earliest proposals for a union of sovereign entities, those of the French jurist and diplomat Pierre Dubois in 1306, and of George of Podebrad, king of Bohemia in 1463, were meant to counter the efforts of the Roman Catholic Church, through the Holy Roman Empire, to achieve an imperial unification of Europe (Hadjilambrinos, 2018).

Proposals for creating a European common polity of some sort continued over the next three centuries. Some of the most notable of these came from the Duke of Sully (1560-1641), Eméric Crucé (1590-1648), William Penn (1644-1718), Abbé de Saint-Pierre (1658-1778), Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), and Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) (Hadjilambrinos, 2018; Foerster, 1967; de Rougemont, 1966; Halecki, 1963). While most of these proposals were based on an intergovernmental model of integration (i.e., one based on representatives of sovereigns or governments), some, notably those by Penn and Bentham, were truly federalist in proposing structures based on direct representation of the peoples of Europe. It is notable that the normative underpinnings of each proposal was reflected in the institutional structure it put forth: intergovernmental proposals generally centered on councils of representatives of the governments of the various nation-states, the federalist proposals centered on parliamentary assemblies that were elected by, and, therefore, directly represented the people (Hadjilambrinos, 2018).

The nineteenth and early twentieth centuries brought along an important change in the character of proposals for European unification. Early in this period, Henri de Saint-Simon published a plan for European Federation, which set out an incremental process of integration. Saint-Simon’s plan called for the union of only Britain and France, with other countries joining as they adopted parliamentary systems of government and as their people developed a common European identity. Recognizing that the institutions of the Federation would be the most important vehicle for the evolution of such an identity, Saint Simon had to address the problem of how the Federation and its institutions would be made possible without a broadly established European identity. He got around this
problem by proposing a functional approach to integration, based on free
trade, and by having the Federation’s parliamentary body represent not the
people of the member states, but those segments of the population that
were more likely to have a common European identity: the business,
industrial, scientific, and administrative elites (Saint Simon, 1814).
Saint Simon’s proposal ushered an era during which functionalist ideals,
based on the industrial revolution’s emergent values of efficiency,
productivity, and economic growth, came to dominate the proposals for
European integration. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century, a number of prominent Europeans, including Anatole and Paul
Leroy-Beaulieu, Sir Max Waecther, the Prince de Cassano, Louis Loucheur,
and Aristide Briand, put forth plans for European unification based on
economic integration. These plans generally proposed institutional
structures that were dominated by technocrats, similar to what had been
proposed by Saint Simon (Hadjilambrinos, 2018; Pegg 1983). Though the
plans by Loucheur and Briand actually came close to fruition, the shock of
the Great Depression and the emergence of radical nationalist movements
in the 1930s prevented that from happening.

The Second World War created a new dynamic for European
integration. The occupation of most of Western Europe by the Nazi war
machine led to the creation of numerous “governments in exile,” all of
which were based on British territory. In order to be able to continue the
war effort, these governments had to cooperate closely with each other and
with the British and, later, U.S. governments in all political, military, and
economic (primarily procurement of military equipment and supplies)
matters. This experience, which built upon the similar experience of
cooperation in the planning of production of war materiel during the First
World War, established an important base for future efforts at integration.

The devastation of the war and the loss of both military and economic
preeminence of the Western European nations drove home, to both the
peoples and political elites of the part of the continent that remained
outside Soviet domination, the point that a certain degree of integration
was essential to the political and economic survival of Europe. Yet, for
several years after the end of the war, and despite the construction of
institutions such as The Council of Europe and the Organization for
European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), no true federal structures had
emerged, and no transfer of sovereignty had taken place. Both The Council
of Europe and the OEEC remained intergovernmental bodies with no
policymaking authority, even though the former’s structure included a Parliamentary Assembly. Proposals for truly supranational institutions such as the European Defense Community (EDC) and the European Political Community failed (though the EDC treaty was signed in 1952, it did not come into force when the French Parliament voted against its ratification).

3. Laying the foundations of the European Union: Jean Monnet and the European Coal and Steel Community

The first intergovernmental institution in post-World War II Europe was the European Coal Organization (ECO). ECO was formed at the instigation of the U.S.A. almost immediately after the end of the war because of the severe disruption of energy supplies the war had caused. Heavily urbanized, Western Europe was primarily dependent on coal for the basic energy needs of its inhabitants. Before the war, over 90% of primary energy demand in the region was met by coal (Evans, 1979). The disruption of both supply and demand of coal which was caused by the war, made reconstruction contingent on steady supplies of coal, and rendered the rebuilding of coal industry an urgent objective (Lucas, 1977: 1-2). Given this, it is not at all surprising that the first truly supranational institutions in Europe, those of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) were constructed around an energy resource in general and coal in particular.

The ECSC was the idea of Jean Monnet whose unique experience placed him in the position to take advantage of a critical conjunction of opportunities in order to overcome the problems that had stopped any progress of European integration beyond the stage of intergovernmental organizations. During the First World War, Monnet had served as France’s representative on the Inter-Allied Maritime Transport Council—a group of technical experts which controlled the allocation of shipping capacity by itself, prioritizing the requests of the governments of the allied nations. This experience convinced him of the advantages of an international authority comprised of technocrats and operating outside the conventional political process. The cooperative way in which the national representatives would work to address common problems and then influence their governments at the initial stages of decision-making so they would act not to promote their strict self interest but, rather, the common good, was an invaluable lesson in supra nationality (Monnet, 1976: 92; Fransen 2001: 23-
After the war, he served on the secretariat of The League of Nations, first as undersecretary-general and then as deputy secretary-general—the second highest ranking position in the organization.

At the outbreak of the Second World War, Monnet pushed for the creation of a joint French and British authority to coordinate planning of the two nations’ war economies. When the two allied governments created the Franco-British Coordinating Committee, Monnet was appointed as chair, jointly by the two governments (at his insistence), and, on the basis of this dual appointment, declared himself an Allied official, rather than a national representative. In June 1940, when the collapse of France under the rapid advance of the German army became inevitable, Monnet crafted a proposal for the formation of an “indissoluble union” between France and Great Britain (a plan, similar in many ways to Saint-Simon’s proposal of just over a century before). After gaining the tacit approval of France’s Prime Minister Paul Reynaud, Monnet worked with Robert Vansittart, Chief Diplomatic Adviser to the British Foreign Secretary to write a preliminary draft of the Declaration of Union which was approved by the British War Council on the afternoon of June 16. Unfortunately, this came two days after the Germans had entered Paris and was too late to save the alliance. The French Cabinet had already turned against Reynaud who was forced to resign as prime minister that same day, being replaced by the Fascist-leaning Marshall Philippe Pétain. Six days later, the French government signed a peace treaty with Germany.

After the war, Monnet oversaw the reconstruction of France as Commissioner (head) of the Commissariat Général du Plan (CGP)—an agency that he proposed and created in 1946, under the authority of the government of national unity of de Gaulle. While not a ministry, the Commissariat was placed, at Monnet’s insistence, directly under the Prime Minister. Furthermore, while it appeared to embody centralized planning, it actually took a broad consultative approach, relying on numerous (24 by 1947) sectoral Modernization Commissions. Broad constituencies from each sector of the economy (consisting of employers, cadres, workers, and experts—a makeup reminiscent of Saint-Simon’s ideas) made up each sectoral Commission. The members were chosen by Monnet himself and served as individuals rather than as representatives of their own constituencies. The two-way communication, from the Commissions to the Commissariat to convey information that was used in planning, and from the Commissariat to the Commissions and, thus, to the constituencies,
communicating broad as well as sectoral objectives and goals, created broad support at the base, including within the bureaucracy, that was useful in convincing the politicians (the ministers and Parliament) to hold as close to the plan as possible when short-term political considerations would have caused significant departures (Duchêne, 1994: 147-180). The CGP’s success lies in “[t]he genius of [Monnet] and his lieutenants... to avoid ideology at the political and theoretical levels and demarcation disputes at the bureaucratic one; then to produce good papers and have good conversations to present their views and convince people...” (Duchêne, 1994: 178) By staying outside government and conventional ideological politics, Monnet remained as Planning Commissioner the only element of stable governance in the tumultuous Fourth Republic, outlasting in his time of service (from January 1947 till August 1952) twelve different governments.

Because of the influence he exerted on every post-World War II French government up to 1952, Monnet was in a unique position during a unique conjunction of historical circumstances to advance the cause of European union decisively. The aftermath of World War I, and the near-success of Launcher’s and Briand’s plans for European integration had highlighted the singular position of France in advancing this cause. World War II made the interest of France in the European cause even clearer. As early as 1943, Monnet had developed some remarkably clear and prescient ideas about the role of France in unifying the continent, and about how such a union could be pursued:

In Monnet’s view, the key to Europe was the reestablishment of democratic institutions within France. France, alone among the Allies, was unavoidably “European” and its fate was tied to that of Europe. Monnet threw together the English with the Russians and Americans who could pull out of Europe at will and retreat to their respective empires. This was not possible for France. In addition, with Italy and Germany crushed by the Allies, France would “again become the first continental power.” Monnet concluded that “it is therefore only from France that can come the conception of a New European Order and the impulse that can allow one, if not to hope for its complete realization, at least to try and achieve partial success.” (Fransen, 2001: 88)

At that early time, Monnet foresaw the creation of a political entity around the heavy metallurgical industry, that was to definitely include France, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and, possibly, Germany,
but definitely exclude Britain (due to its likely opposition to any truly supranational entity). (Fransen, 2001: 87-92) These ideas have clear links to those of the French Europeanists of the inter-war period, especially Loucheur (with whom Monnet had actually had a rather thorny relationship) and his ideas for the creation of supranational industrial cartels, and lead directly as far back as Saint-Simon.

The unique conjunction of circumstances that enabled the realization of Monnet’s vision came about in 1949 and 1950. The end of the war had left Germany divided into Soviet, British, American, and French zones of control. In 1949 the Soviets established the Democratic Republic of Germany in the territories under their control and the other Allies, pushed by the U.S., countered by allowing the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany in their zones. This raised the issue of assumption of German sovereign control over all of the areas controlled by the Western Allies, including the heavily industrialized areas of the Saar—which was under French control—and the Ruhr—which was under the jurisdiction of the International Ruhr Authority. France saw the full assumption of German sovereignty over these areas as particularly threatening because it would lose all means of control over energy and industrial resources that had become vital to its own post-war recovery. The signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in April 1949 led to increased pressure by the British and Americans on the French to accede to the establishment of full German sovereignty and to the re-militarization of Germany (something that was an even greater cause for worry to the French than relinquishing all control over German resources). The situation was brought to a head at the September 1949 meeting of the three Western Allies’ foreign ministers. At that time, the U.S. Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, gave the French a last chance to propose a constructive solution to the problem of German sovereignty. He requested that French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman present a proposal for a new German policy at the next meeting of the three, which was to take place in London in May 1950.

Monnet seized this opportunity and tasked a small number of his staff at the CGP with helping him develop a proposal to present to Schuman. This proposal centered on placing the most important industries of the Saar and Ruhr, coal and steel, in the control of a supranational authority. This authority would assume control of not only the coal and steel industries of Germany but also of France and any other state that chose to join. Coal and steel were ideal as the functional areas on which the first supranational
European institutions were to be based. These were industries in which France and Germany were interdependent. Furthermore, coal and steel had great symbolic value as key strategic resources. These elements were recognized by Monnet, and on these he based his proposal for the creation of the ECSC. His thoughts on this matter are recounted in his memoirs:

The joint resources of France and Germany lay essentially in their coal and steel, distributed unevenly but in complementary fashion over a triangular area artificially divided by historical frontiers. With the industrial revolution, which had coincided with the rise of doctrinal nationalism, these frontiers had become barriers to trade and then lines of confrontation. Neither country now felt secure unless it commanded all the resources—i.e., all the area. Their rival claims were decided by war, which solved the problem only for a time—the time to prepare for revenge. Coal and steel were at once the key to economic power and the raw materials for forging weapons of war. This double role gave them immense symbolic significance, now largely forgotten, but comparable at the time to that of nuclear energy today. To pool them across frontiers would reduce their malign prestige and turn them instead into a guarantee of peace. (Monnet, 1976: 293)

This passage vividly illustrates Monnet’s clear understanding of the patterns in which industrial and energy policy had traditionally been conceived. The relationship between industrial development and international conflict, the importance of control of energy resources (at that time coal) as a key to national economic and military power, and the emergence of nuclear power in the same role, clearly constitute the reasons for Monnet's choice of coal and steel, and later of nuclear power as the functional regimes for European integration. His belief was that the transformation of these regimes from national into supranational would diminish the symbolic importance attached to them and convert them from areas of international conflict into forces for cooperation.

The proposal went through several drafts (nine exist in the archives) before Monnet presented it to Schuman on April 28, 1950. Whereas the earliest draft proposed the creation of a Federal District (along the lines of the District of Columbia in the U.S.) in the French and German steel and coal producing regions, the final version contained only a proposal for a supranational institutional structure. Monnet’s proposal, thus, was that the French and German (as well as any nation’s wishing to join) coal and steel industries be placed under the control of a supranational Common High
Authority which would have broad powers to create a free market for these commodities and integrate national industries to a common international regime (Fransen, 2001: 94-98). Monnet’s idea for the structure of the High Authority was of a small technocratic institution, similar to the CGP, which would be independent from the governments in ways similar to the independence of the CGP from the French ministries (Monnet always acknowledged his intent to replicate the CGP model—for example the day after the Schuman declaration he told a British diplomat that what he had in mind was “a European CGP”). (Duchêne, 1994: 210)

After securing the support for the idea of the German Chancellor Conrad Adenauer, Schuman obtained the approval of the French Cabinet on May 9 and made what has become known as “The Schuman Plan” public at a press conference on the afternoon of that day. In the negotiations for the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community that followed, Monnet played a crucial role. He was, in effect, the French delegation, as he was the only government appointee on the delegation. The rest of the members were his aides whom he had been given the authority to select himself. In addition, after meeting with Adenauer for the first time, Monnet was asked by the Chancellor to vet the prospective head of the German delegation. Monnet, in fact, turned down one candidate, the AEG director Hans C. Boden, before endorsing Walter Hallstein, a legal expert and rector of Frankfurt University (Duchêne, 1994: 207-209).

The negotiations between the six interested nations (France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, The Netherlands, and Luxembourg) began in Paris on June 20, 1950, on the basis of a draft treaty document presented by the French delegation. This document envisaged a Community based on a single market in coal and steel in which customs duties, national subsidies, and discriminatory and restrictive trade practices would be abolished. The single market would be established and supervised by a High Authority which would have powers to plan supply, handle shortages of supply or demand, and prepare production forecasts as guidelines for investment. The High Authority would consult with, but be independent from national governments. Its independence would be guaranteed by its power to raise its own revenue through taxes on the commodities under its authority: coal and steel. The High Authority would operate through regional consultative associations (similar in many ways to the Modernization Commissions of the CGP) that would be organized along natural lines, such as coal basins,
regardless of national frontiers. The one significant difference between the plan Monnet had presented to Schuman and the draft treaty was the inclusion of a Common Assembly, with representatives drawn from the national parliaments. The Assembly was included at the suggestion of Andre Philip (Christian Socialist politician, former Finance Minister of France, and active in the European Federalist movement) in order to balance the strictly functionalist technocratic institution of the High Authority with a federalist structure. Nevertheless, the Common Assembly was to have very limited powers: to review the High Authority’s annual report and to censure the Authority by dismissing it en bloc. There was no provision for a court, as disputes were to be resolved through ad hoc arbitration tribunals, similar to the one Monnet had utilized in 1921, during his tenure at the League of Nations, to resolve the conflict between Germany and Poland over Upper Silesia (Duchène, 1994: 210).

The intense negotiations that lasted for ten months produced a treaty (the Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, commonly known as the Treaty of Paris—from here on referred to as the Treaty) which, while maintaining the core of the draft treaty relatively intact, included some important additions. Despite strong efforts by the Dutch and Belgian delegations to dilute the supranational powers of the High Authority, Monnet, supported by Hallstein, managed to preserve them mostly intact. The only concession to intergovernmentalism was the inclusion of a Special Council of (national) ministers which would have the authority to adopt policies when effects on the economies of the member states extended beyond the creation of the common market for coal and steel. Thus, the primary purpose of the Council was “harmonizing the action of the High Authority and that of the Governments which are responsible for the general economic policy of their countries.” (ECSC, 1951: Article 26) Since it was not meant to be an important policy initiator, the treaty, in almost all cases, required Council unanimity, unless proposals for Council action emanated from the High Authority. In those cases, where the Council could act by majority vote, assent to the High Authority’s proposals was facilitated by requiring, in cases where a simple majority was not attained and if the High Authority persisted with its proposal, presenting it for a “second reading,” only a qualified majority vote, which was defined as the vote of any two member States each of which accounted for at least twenty percent of the coal and steel production of the Community. (ECSC, 1951: Article 28)
Pressure from the European Federalist movement also led to a significant treaty modification: the formalization of the arbitration tribunals into the Community’s own Court of Justice. Despite the infusion of federal and intergovernmental institutions, however, the ECSC emerged with a predominantly functionalist institutional structure. The High Authority remained the central institution of the Community, charged by the Treaty with sole responsibility “for assuring the achievement of the purposes stated in this Treaty within the terms thereof” (ECSC, 1951: Article 9). The nine members of the High Authority were not to be political figures but, rather, technical experts, “chosen for their general competence” (ECSC, 1951: Article 9). It was not simply an administrative or executive body but was granted significant legislative powers. Article 14 of the treaty authorized it to issue orders, which could be directed to both industry and the member States’ governments. Orders were binding and could be issued by majority vote of the members of the High Authority in specific issue areas specified by the treaty (pertaining primarily to establishing the single market for coal and steel and assuring that no violations of the Treaty’s objectives were permitted). In most cases its decisions did not require Council assent. One important element of what subsequently came to be called the principle of “subsidiarity” was put in place by the Treaty, as Article 14 prescribed that “Decisions shall be binding with respect to the objectives which they specify but shall leave to those to whom they are directed the choice of appropriate means for attaining these objectives.” (ECSC, 1951)

The organizational structure of the High Authority reflected directly Monnet’s experiences of effective operation at both the intra- and intergovernmental levels, taken to the next step—that of a supranational institution. This is particularly apparent in the guarantees provided by the Treaty for the independence from national governments of the members of the High Authority and in the establishment of direct linkages (bypassing the national governments) with its constituencies—the coal and steel industries. Specifically, the Treaty, in Article 10, specified that eight of the nine members of the High Authority were to be appointed by the Member States’ governments acting in concert, while the ninth was to be selected by the eight appointed members. Thus, none of the High Authority members were to represent their governments. The Treaty also bound the Member States to refrain from any attempt to influence the members of the High Authority (ECSC, 1951: Article 9) and directed the members of the High
Authority to exercise their functions purely to promote the common interest:

The members of the High Authority shall exercise their functions in complete independence, in the general interest of the Community. In the fulfillment of their duties, they shall neither solicit nor accept instructions from any government or from any organization. They will abstain from all conduct incompatible with the supranational character of their functions.

Furthermore, the Treaty consolidated and formalized the regional consultative associations Monnet had envisioned into a single Consultative Committee. The Committee was attached to the High Authority, and its members, representing producers, workers, consumers and dealers of coal and steel, while coming from specific groups and organizations, served in a personal capacity and not as representatives of their group or organization.

4. From the ECSC to European Union

The perception of the people and the governments of Western Europe in the aftermath of World War II that energy was scarce and expensive was an important factor in the success of the Schuman plan and the creation of an ECSC that extended beyond France and Germany. The conditions of scarcity lasted through 1956 and 1957. The 1956 closure of the Suez Canal, through which most of Western Europe's oil supply passed, heightened this perception, leading the High Authority to plan further increases in coal-mining capacity (Lucas, 1977: 29). These conditions facilitated the completion of the single market in coal because they permitted the ECSC to pursue goals that were aligned with national interests (Lambert et al., 1969: 267-268). In other words, the ECSC appeared to be able to promote national economic objectives by facilitating the expansion of the coal and steel industries (thus promoting security of supplies and employment).

The momentum created by the establishment of the ECSC and its apparent success over the first few years of its existence led to renewed efforts to create more extensive supranational structures in Western Europe. The impending re-armament of Germany, made necessary by the engagement of the U.S. in the Korean War, provided the impetus for the establishment of a European Defense Community (EDC) which would control a combined European army. The EDC proposal by French Prime Minister René Plevé was, again, rejected by the British, but was received positively by the other five ECSC member states. The hitherto success of
the ECSC institutional arrangements were clearly a factor in the way Pleven shaped his proposal. In his announcement of the EDC plan, Pleven made repeated reference to the ECSC as a model for cooperation (Patijn, 1970: 83). However, whether the institutional model of the ECSC could have been effective in directing a European army is questionable (Fursdon, 1980).

The EDC treaty, signed by the governments of the six on May 27, 1952, largely replicated the institutional arrangements of the ECSC (Patijn, 1970). The debate over the establishment of the EDC revealed the need for an overarching supranational political entity. This led to the proposal by Italian Prime Minister Alcide de Gasperi for the creation of a European Political Community (EPC). While the de Gasperi proposal did not lead to a separate round of negotiations for an EPC, the EDC treaty included, in its Article 38, provision for the subsequent establishment of the EPC. In this Article, the EDC treaty directed the (temporary) EDC Assembly to work towards the creation of a democratically elected Assembly that was to become the cornerstone of the EPC. In fact, at the proposal of the Italian representative, in its first meeting in September 1952, the ECSC Council appointed a special Assembly, consisting of the ECSC Assembly plus nine additional members, to take on the task of applying Article 38 of the EDC treaty. This Ad Hoc Assembly produced a Draft Treaty Embodying the Statute of the European Community, proposing the establishment of an indissoluble federation with a bi-cameral legislature, with real legislative powers, and an executive council (Griffiths, 2000). When the French parliament voted against ratification of the EDC treaty in 1954, the effort to create a Political Community also collapsed and the process of European integration seemed to have come to a dead end. However, the success of the ECSC in its functional objectives, creating a common market for coal and steel, facilitating expansion of these industries and lowering and stabilizing prices of these commodities, continued to provide hope.

Monnet, deciding to take personal charge of the effort to push the integration effort forward, resigned his position as President of the High Authority in 1955 and created the Action Committee for the United States of Europe. This was an informal international organization composed of representatives of political parties and trade unions, united by their support of the ideal of a federal Europe. This group, along with leading politicians such as Adenauer, Hallstein, Spaak, de Gasperi and Beyen, brought to bear effective pressure on the governments of the six member
states of the ECSC to continue the building of supranational functional regimes pursuant to political integration. Common economic interests were, again, the focal point of the integration process:

A new demarche had basically to take account of two things. Firstly there was no hope of bringing about a supranational federal state in the short term. Secondly, it had to be assumed that no West European state would be in a position on its own in the long term to solve its political and economic problems effectively within the framework of the nation state (Küsters, 1989: 80-81).

The experience of the failure of the EDC and EPC reinforced Monnet’s conviction that, at least for the time being, integration would have to proceed along narrow functional lines rather than through the pursuit of broad federalist objectives. Specifically, it appeared that the success of the ECSC invited the creation of further supranational energy regimes. Monnet's vision was that the creation of such regimes would form the basis for long-term prosperity in the participating nations; realization that unity offered considerable benefits would be unavoidable and could only lead to the eventual acceptance of political union by the people of Europe. In 1955 no energy resource appeared to offer a better prospect for a supranational regime than atomic power. Not only was nuclear technology expected to produce large amounts of energy at very low cost, but the fact that there were no national nuclear regimes yet established, combined with technology development costs too high for any European nation to easily shoulder alone to make this technology an ideal ground for combining efforts and, therefore, for the extension of the ECSC regime. Furthermore, nuclear technology’s demonstrated immense destructive potential as a weapon of war made some form of international control a critical element of the maintenance of peace. Monnet believed that, while coal formed Europe’s energy base at the present, atomic energy was the continent’s energy future. If a supranational structure controlled both, it would control the most crucial element of the European economy. Monnet’s vision for the direction of further European integration efforts were concisely and explicitly stated as the strategy and goal of the Action Committee for the United States of Europe: "The United States of Europe, means: a federal power linked to the peaceful exploitation of Atomic Energy." (Monnet, 1955)

The rallying call for continuing progress after the failure of the EDC took place under the label of "Relance Européenne" (European New
Beginning). It started with the proposal of Monnet and the Action Committee that unification be broadened to the field of atomic energy which would also be placed under the ECSC High Authority. This proposal was taken up and extended to include the whole economic sphere by the governments of the Benelux countries. At the meeting of the ECSC Foreign Ministers, assembled at Messina in June 1955 to choose a successor for Monnet as president of the High Authority, the representatives of these three countries jointly submitted a memorandum that argued that European unity could be achieved only through economic integration. They proposed both a "horizontal" integration through the formation of a common market and "vertical" integration through joint action in the fields of conventional energy, nuclear energy, and transport (Lucas, 1977: 12). These proposals were accepted in principle by the other countries, and a committee was appointed to study the technical issues surrounding the economic integration process. Paul-Henri Spaak, Foreign Minister of Belgium and a strong supporter of European integration, was appointed to lead the committee which contained a number of officials deeply committed to the idea of integration. The committee’s report strongly endorsed the ideas contained in both the proposals of the Action Committee for the United States of Europe and of the Benelux countries:

No European country is of the economic status to make the immense effort in scientific research and basic investment required to set in motion the technical revolution promised by the atomic era. Even if production were stepped up by exploiting new sources of energy and applying new techniques, it would still be hampered by lack of outlets in the narrow confines of the separate European markets. The atomic revolution will in a few years’ time make our present economic structure an anachronism. It was these considerations which led the six Foreign Ministers at Messina to attempt European unification first of all in the economic field, placing the emphasis on two essential projects: the pooling of atomic resources and the establishment of a general common market. (Council of Europe, 1956: 7)

In order to pursue the objectives of these proposals, the committee laid out a plan that proposed the creation of two new communities, the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and urged that the six ECSC Member State governments begin negotiations as soon as possible.

The long and complex negotiations were eventually successful and the treaties establishing the two new communities, known as the Treaties of
Rome, were signed by the six on March 25, 1957 and came into effect on January 1, 1958. The Treaties put in place institutional structures which, in part, paralleled and, in part, were in common with that of the ECSC. Each of the two new Communities would have its own executive body (Commission) which would be advised by a special advisory committee (Economic and Social Committee for EEC and both Economic and Social Committee and Scientific and Technical Committee for Euratom), and its own Council of Ministers. All three Communities would share the Court of Justice and parliamentary Assembly that were already part of the ECSC (and the EEC and Euratom would share the Economic and Social Committee). Thus, the institutional structure of the ECSC was transferred fairly intact to the two new Communities (Table 1).

The Rome Treaties also replicated the provisions requiring that appointments to the Commissions be based on the technical qualifications of perspective Commissioners, guaranteeing the supranationality and independence of action of the Commissioners and requiring that the members of the Economic and Social, and Scientific and Technical Committees serve in a personal capacity and not as representatives of any organization. The main difference in the organization of the new Communities vis-à-vis that of the ECSC was the establishment of the Council of Ministers as the primary legislative body. Unlike the ECSC High Authority, the EEC and Euratom Commissions had limited legislative powers. As with the High Authority, however, the Commissions retained the (almost exclusive) right to initiate legislation. The Common Assembly retained its very limited role, with its functions in the new Communities being essentially the same as in the ECSC and did not benefit from this “transfer” of legislative authority.
Table 1: Institutions of the ECSC, EEC, and Euratom, as provided by the original founding treaties.

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<th>ECSC</th>
<th>EEC</th>
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<tr>
<td>Executive body</td>
<td>High Authority</td>
<td>EEC Commission</td>
<td>Euratom Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advisory body</td>
<td>Consultative Committee</td>
<td>Scientific and Technical Committee</td>
<td>Economic and Social Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>Legislative body</td>
<td>Council of Ministers</td>
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<td>Judicial body</td>
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<td>Court of Justice</td>
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<td>Parliamentary body</td>
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<td>Common Assembly</td>
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Subsequent Treaties modified the institutional and organizational structure but did not change significantly the European Communities’ policymaking process. The first of these treaties, the Merger Treaty, signed on April 8, 1965 and entering into force on July 1, 1967, merged the remaining separate institutions of the three Communities: the ECSC High Authority and EEC and Euratom Commissions were merged into a single Commission, and the three separate Councils into a single Council of Ministers. However, the single new Commission retained the legislative powers the ECSC Treaty granted the High Authority in the specific areas delineated in the ECSC Treaty, i.e., in matters pertaining to the common market in coal and steel. Consequently, the overall policymaking apparatus of the now renamed European Communities remained unchanged.

The Single European Act, signed on February 17, 1986 and entering into force on July 1, 1987, and The Treaty on European Union (commonly known as the Maastricht Treaty), signed on February 7, 1992 and entering into force on November 1, 1993, expanded the Communities’ (first renamed European Community and, finally, European Union) institutional structure by formalizing the regular meetings of the Heads of State or Government of the Member States into a new institution, the European Council, where major political decisions for furthering the process of political integration are to be taken, expanding the court system to include a Court of First Instance (to hear a variety of cases as a first-tier court) and a
Court of Auditors (to hear administrative cases), and establishing a Committee of the Regions as an additional advisory body. They also introduced the first significant changes to the policymaking process by expanding the issue areas in which the Council of Ministers, when acting on Commission proposals, can act by qualified majority vote, and by expanding the role of the Assembly (now named European Parliament). The Maastricht Treaty in particular gave the European Parliament (whose members are now directly elected every five years) a policy-making role. While still not able to initiate legislation, or even to take the initiative in enacting the Commission’s legislative proposals, it can amend or veto legislation in many policy areas. In certain other policy areas, it only has the right of consulting with the Commission and Council. Nevertheless, the enhancement of the Parliament’s role constitutes the first significant departure from the policymaking process put in place by the European Union’s founding treaties, the Treaties of Paris and Rome—a departure in the direction of increased federalism.

5. Conclusions

The policymaking process of the European Union embodies a combination of the three fundamental ideologies of international organization. The central role of the Commission as policy initiator reflects the functionalist ideal of a competent and benevolent technocratic body operating outside the constraints of traditional partisan and nationalistic politics. This ideal, which originated with Saint-Simon and was at the core of French proposals for European integration in the inter-war years (1918-1939), was finally realized in the ECSC High Authority. Monnet, who was anything but a political theorist, conceived the High Authority on the basis of his own experiences as to how effective a cohesive, agile, technical body could be at resolving problems that appeared to be intractable in both the national and international political context.

The Court and Parliament embody the federalist ideal of supranational organization—an ideal that has its roots in the seventeenth century and the writings of Crucé and Penn. They were, in fact, included in the institutional structure of the ECSC at the urging of federalists such as Andre Philip. These institutions, especially the Parliament, however, represented the traditional political processes, taken to the international level. For this reason, the ECSC Assembly was vested with very little power, and its
direct descendent, the European Parliament, enhanced its role in the EU’s policymaking process very slowly and, primarily, as a response to the “democratic deficit” that has prevailed in the EU from its inception as the ECSC until today (Fischer, 2000).

List of References


