Policy of Tariff Protection in the Light of WTO Accession
Tariff rates are crucial instrument of trade policy. This paper covers several important issues related to the reforms of this area. First part of the paper explains the key features of tariffs as protection instrument: different policy takers and opposite economic interests; benefits and adverse effects; alternative measures of protection; dependence of tariff policy on the development priorities and the welfare effects, etc.
This document explains main World Trade Organization requirements concerning protection policy such as primary role of tariffs, restricted set of non-tariff instruments, limited scope of safeguard measures, comparison on the legal development in the field until now, and an indication of further legislation changes necessary in the period of adjustment. It also gives main elements of the customs-reform strategy: choice and concentration of goals and priorities; criteria for preparation of the alternative scenarios; solving convergence problems; defining conditionality for alternative solutions and interdependence of relevant externalities. The goal of the paper is to give recommendation for trade policy reform in our country necessarily to become member of World Trade Organization.
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